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ELECTION ANALYSIS 
 
Urban Renewal and Regional Growth: 
Muddled Objectives and Mixed Progress 
 
• Since 1997, Labour has committed to improve the UK’s ‘underperforming’ 
neighbourhoods, cities and regions.  
 
• The public service agreement on regional growth commits the government to ‘improve 
the economic performance of all English regions and reduce the gap in economic growth 
rates between regions’. There is little evidence of significant progress against this 
objective. 
 
• The role played by the regional development agencies (RDAs) is hard to assess. There is 
no compelling evidence on whether RDAs are a good or bad thing. 
 
• The government has also committed considerable resources to trying to improve 
outcomes in deprived neighbourhoods. Expenditures have provided important public 
goods, for example, improved social housing. But there appears to have been little 
progress in narrowing the gap between the outcomes for the most seriously disadvantaged 
individuals and the rest. 
 
• As with RDA expenditure, it is difficult to get compelling evidence on the impact of these 
initiatives. Based on the best evidence that we have available (for the New Deal for 
Communities), a reasonably well-funded ‘area-based initiative’ has not, on average, 
improved individual outcomes in targeted areas. 
 
• Some argue that there can be no assumption that ‘success’ is best measured by what 
happens to individuals as opposed to what happens to areas. Most economists would 
disagree with this suggestion: they view improving places as a means to an end rather 
than as an end in itself. 
 
• Understandably, constituency-based politicians often care about area outcomes 
irrespective of the effect on individuals. Add to this the fact that voluntary ‘sorting’ in 
response to initiatives makes their impact very hard to evaluate and it is clear why the 
thinking of all political parties on the objectives for – and effectiveness of – spatial policy 
remains muddled. 
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Introduction 
 
Since its election in 1997, the Labour government has been committed to improving the 
fortunes of the UK’s ‘underperforming’ neighbourhoods, cities and regions. It has used a 
complex array of policy initiatives to try to achieve this objective.  
 
This Election Analysis considers the evidence on the effects of some of these initiatives, with 
a focus on the role of ‘area-based initiatives’, which try to improve outcomes in particular 
areas. It also considers the overall impacts. 
 
The evidence suggests that progress against objectives has been mixed. This is unsurprising. 
The economic processes that drive spatial differences are poorly understood and what 
evidence we do have has played little part in the formulation of policy. As a result, there is 
confusion about what urban and regional policy could and should try to achieve. This 
confusion is shared by all political parties. 
 
 
Regional policy 
 
Places throughout the UK – regions, cities and neighbourhoods – appear very unequal. This is 
true if we look at average earnings, employment, education and almost any other socio-
economic outcome. 
 
For example, in 2005, in terms of gross value added (GVA) per person, the highest ranked 
(NUTS 3) regions in the UK were West Inner London and Berkshire with GVAs of £44,050 
and £39,850 respectively. The lowest ranked were Liverpool and Blackpool, with GVAs that 
were half of those in London and Berkshire: £19,800 and £21,050. 
 
These individual examples are representative of a broader trend – the top ranked 10% of UK 
(NUTS 3) regions have GVA at least 50% higher than the bottom ranked 10%. 
 
The public service agreement on regional growth commits the government to ‘improve the 
economic performance of all English regions and reduce the gap in economic growth rates 
between regions’. To help achieve this objective in England, the government created regional 
development agencies (RDAs) in 1999.1 The devolved administrations all have agencies with 
broadly similar objectives. 
 
There is little evidence of significant progress against this objective. The most recent 
assessment (August 2009) by the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS), 
reports ‘some progress’. Between 2002 and 2007, five regions improved on baseline (1990-
2002) while four regions saw weaker growth. 
 
In terms of narrowing differences in growth rates, assessment is based on the gap between the 
Greater South East and the North, Midlands and South West. Again, comparing up to 2007 
against the 1990s baseline suggests a small improvement: the gap has fallen from 0.6 to 0.5 
percentage points. But add in the 2008 downturn and the gap rises to 0.7.2 
 
                                                 
1 The London Development Agency was created in 2000. 
2 Data taken from ‘Key Indicators’ (http://stats.berr.gov.uk/reppsa2/), accessed 25/01/10. 
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The role played by the RDAs in these developments is hard to assess. 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers found that every £1 spent by the RDAs added £4.50 to regional 
GVA. These numbers seem very high, reflecting the fact that the evaluation almost certainly 
attributes things to RDA activities when they (or something else that generates value) would 
have happened regardless. 
 
Estimating the ‘additionality’ of government interventions is difficult. But it would be fair to 
say that the approach adopted by most evaluations of RDA expenditures (asking project 
managers or recipients) is close to the bottom of the ranking in terms of rigour. 
 
In short, there is no compelling evidence as to whether the RDAs are a good or bad thing. 
Labour is committed to them; the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats are (probably) 
committed to abolishing them. It should be clear that these positions cannot truly reflect 
evidence-based positions on RDAs’ effectiveness. 
 
The Conservatives’ concerns are mostly around RDAs’ new regional planning role (they 
think powers should rest with local authorities) and the fact that they are unelected ‘quangos’. 
The Liberal Democrats share concerns about accountability, but say that they will look at 
value-for-money on a case-by-case basis. 
 
 
Deprived neighbourhoods 
 
Turning to smaller neighbourhoods, the government has again committed considerable 
resources to trying to improve outcomes. The National Strategy for Neighbourhood Renewal 
(2001) focused on deprived neighbourhoods and aimed to ensure that within 10 to 20 years, 
no one would be seriously disadvantaged by where they live. 
 
As well as directing mainstream funding, specific programmes have been associated with this 
objective: the New Deal for Communities (NDC), the Neighbourhood Renewal Fund (NRF) 
and, slightly later, Housing Market Renewal Pathfinders. New initiatives continue to appear, 
for example, the Working Neighbourhoods Fund. Unsurprisingly, given the complexity and 
the state of government finances, we do not know what the policy mix in this area will look 
like in the next parliament.  
 
Working out the overall impact on deprived neighbourhoods from existing interventions is 
difficult. Expenditures have clearly provided important public goods to deprived areas, for 
example, in the form of improved social housing and public spaces. 
 
But aside from the consumption value of these goods, there appears to have been little 
progress in narrowing the gap between the outcomes for the most seriously disadvantaged 
individuals and the rest.3  
 
Of course, this does not mean that policy has had no impact: things may have been worse 
without them. But as with RDA expenditure, it is difficult to get compelling evidence on the 
impact of these initiatives.4 
                                                 
3 National Equality Panel (2010). 
4 For example, the recent evaluation of the NRF states that: ‘There is very limited data available to evidence 
outcomes at a local level. Therefore we provide comment on who benefited from NRF based on how funds have 
been targeted and stakeholder perceptions of the outcomes arising.’ 
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The evaluation of the NDC is more rigorous.5 The NDC is a 10-year policy, which spends 
£400 per household per year in 39 of the most deprived areas of the country. Evidence on its 
impact to date is disappointing. According to the summary of the recent evaluation: 
 
‘NDC areas are experiencing positive change, some of which is over and above that 
occurring in the comparator areas.’ Specifically, ‘[a]fter controlling for base 
characteristics, residents in NDC areas have on average seen statistically greater 
positive change in relation to their satisfaction with the area compared with 
comparator residents […]. This is not, however, the case when a respondent’s initial 
level of satisfaction is included.’ 
 
In the full report, it appears that (controlling for socio-demographic factors) individuals in 
NDC areas did worse on between two and seven out of 15 indicators (depending on the time 
period). In other words, based on the best available evidence, a reasonably well-funded area 
policy has not, on average, improved individual outcomes in targeted areas. 
 
The report leaves some wriggle room. There may be area policies in the comparison areas 
that are just as successful – although it seems unlikely that they could be as costly as the 
NDC. It is also early days for the NDC – although the evaluation also suggests that the largest 
gains came first. 
 
The report itself suggests that: 
 
‘There can be no assumption that “success” is best measured in relation to what 
happens to individuals as opposed to what happens to these areas over time’. 
 
This argument is simply baffling. If such policies have equity objectives – for example, 
helping the disadvantaged – then we should care about what happens to individuals not areas. 
The fact that the NDC evaluation can suggest the exact opposite highlights confusion about 
what urban and regional policy could and should try to achieve. 
 
 
What can and should spatial policy do? 
 
As should be clear, the evidence on the impact of UK area policies is mixed and there is 
certainly scope for improving the rigour of the methods used to assess the impact of policy. 
Unfortunately, the situation is not much better looking outside the UK.  
 
For example, two recent evaluations of Empowerment Zones in the United States go some 
way towards addressing methodological concerns. But while one of them finds large positive 
effects of the zones, the other finds almost no effects.6  
 
A recent study provides a useful summary of existing US evidence.7 It suggests that: 
 
(i) Tax incentives seem to work and are most effective at redistributing within 
urban areas. But they are costly and easily offset if labour or land costs in poorer 
                                                 
5 See http://extra.shu.ac.uk/ndc/.   
6 See Busso et al (2009) and Kolko and Neumark (2009). 
7 Bartik (2003). 
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areas are kept relatively high (as a result of, for example, national pay-setting or 
local land regulations). 
 
(ii) ‘Extension’ activities to improve productivity through, for example, 
benchmarking can be relatively cost-effective. 
 
(iii) There is limited evidence on the benefits of ‘cluster’ approaches or focusing on 
high-technology industries.  
 
(iv) The evidence for targeting small businesses is not particularly compelling 
because so many of these businesses sell locally so displacement of existing 
businesses is a real risk. 
 
(v) Evidence on Enterprise Zones or other policies targeted at deprived 
neighbourhoods is mixed. 
 
In the light of this mixed evidence base on the effectiveness of many interventions, some 
economists have begun to argue for trying alternative approaches. One possibility is to try to 
address the problem that relatively expensive land and labour costs provide a disincentive for 
firms to relocate activity to deprived neighbourhoods.  
 
In the UK, national pay structures for public sector workers ensure that their salaries do not 
show as much spatial variation as private sector wages. Given that the public sector is 
disproportionately large in deprived areas (for example, it is approximately 32% in 
Newcastle, 36% in Liverpool and 42% in Hastings compared with 27% for the GB 
average), these higher public sector wages may crowd out private sector employment. 
 
The Conservatives’ manifesto (and subsequent interviews with David Cameron) have 
emphasised the need to increase the share of the private sector in some areas. Interestingly, 
while the Conservatives appear to be suggesting that public sector employment crowds out 
private sector employment in deprived areas, the recent Smith report for HM Treasury 
assumes the opposite (so that moving jobs out of affluent areas has no effect on employment 
because they are simply replaced by private sector jobs).8 Unfortunately, there is essentially 
no evidence available to distinguish between these claims. 
 
National pay structures also have a variable impact on the quality of public services across 
regions. Propper and Van Reenen (2010) show that the national pay system in the NHS 
decreases service quality (as measured by hospital death rates) in high cost areas, such as 
London, without increasing quality much in the low cost areas. 
 
Land use controls that make commercial property expensive in deprived areas also act to 
reduce employment further. For example, commercial rents in Birmingham are twice those in 
San Francisco. This is mostly because Birmingham’s planning restrictions are more 
restrictive than San Francisco, itself a highly regulated city by US standards.9  
 
Another possibility, although one that is even less popular with politicians than suggestions to 
liberalise land planning, is to encourage greater mobility out of deprived areas.10  
                                                 
8 Smith (2010). 
9 Cheshire and Hilber (2008). 
10 Leunig and Swaffield (2008). 
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Understanding what drives spatial disparities 
 
Given the conflicting evidence base, one thing that is needed is much greater clarity about the 
way spatial disparities arise and what, if anything, policy should do about them. Here, the 
academic research literature can help. Spatial policy at all scales is largely based around 
concerns about ‘area inequalities’. But area outcomes are simply aggregates of the outcomes 
for people who live and work in these places. 
 
Without further information, we do not know whether the economic outcomes for people 
currently living in West London would be any different if they lived and worked in 
Newcastle. We have no way of knowing if the productivity of West London and Newcastle 
would change if these movements of people took place. Similarly, we do not know whether 
replicating the economic, policy, institutional and environmental regime of West London in 
Newcastle would change anything without moving people. 
 
In short, while it is relatively easy to measure aggregate economic differences between 
places, it is much harder to work out what these differences mean in terms of the economic 
advantages and disadvantages that a place offers to the people who live and work there. 
 
It is also easy to assume from looking at these overall figures for different areas, that 
inequalities between places are big drivers of individual inequality. But this clearly need not 
be the case. For individuals, the differences between those living and working within the 
same local area may far exceed the differences between the average worker in different areas. 
 
Knowing whether ‘between-place’ inequalities or ‘within-place’ inequalities dominate is thus 
crucial to understanding the role that spatial policy might play in addressing individual 
inequality. Evidence increasingly points to the fact that within-place inequalities play a much 
more important role than between-place inequalities. 
 
Even when we are able to address between-place inequalities (for example, through 
improving public spaces in specific areas), the location decisions of individuals, coupled with 
the working of the housing market, often mean that poorer individuals quickly become priced 
out of much improved areas. 
 
This is one of the key reasons why economists tend to argue for a policy focus on people over 
place.11 That is, they argue for viewing improving places as a means to an end rather than as 
an end in itself. From this viewpoint, it would be very odd to see as successful a policy that 
improved average outcomes in a neighbourhood simply by moving out some of the 
disadvantaged inhabitants. 
 
Unfortunately, but unsurprisingly, constituency-based politicians (from both local and 
national government) sometimes care about area outcomes irrespective of the effect on 
individuals. Add to this the fact that voluntary sorting in response to initiatives makes impact 
very hard to evaluate, and it is clear why the thinking of all political parties on the objectives 
for – and effectiveness of – spatial policy remain muddled. 
 
                                                 
11 See, for example, Glaeser and Gottleib (2008). 
7 
 
Conclusions 
 
The Labour government has spent considerable sums trying to narrow the gap between poor 
areas – neighbourhoods, cities and regions – and the rest. We have very little compelling 
evidence on the impact of these initiatives. 
 
This means that the parties’ positions on regional and urban economic policy tend to be based 
on belief rather than evidence. In addition, policy is often confused about why we care about 
spatial disparities and what, if anything, will be the impact on individuals of addressing them. 
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